Purpose: The purpose of this study was to assess the Biblical approach of Proverbs 1-9 that is applicable and relevant on addressing increased antisocial ills in Africa.Methodology: The study was a desktop research where review of empirical literature was done.Results: It is only in the book of Proverbs 1-9 that we find the individual instructions from parents to their children. The book of Proverbs 1-9 can conveniently serve as the Biblical manual of parenting. The book of Proverbs 1-9 regards the (...) home as the basic institution of learning the life skills. To appropriate the teachings and practices of Proverbs 1-9 in the life of child rearing in the African communities, there is need for the search of the Biblical approach that will enable parents to extract lessons that are applicable and relevant for the purposes of addressing increased anti-social ills in the community. The study argues that traditional-historical method of Biblical analysis as the most appropriate approach to be followed in the quest for the meaning of Proverbs 1-9 that will enable the extraction of lessons that are applicable and relevant in the African child rearing. The nature of the book of Proverbs 1-9 in terms of its traditional historical nature, social setting, purpose, relationship between it and other ancient near East wisdom literature, authorship and social-cultural environment are strong indicators that traditional historical method is the most appropriate approach that is relevant and applicable in the present African communities child rearing.Unique Contribution to Theory, Policy and Practice: The study hypothesizes that if the analysis of Proverbs 1-9 engages traditional-historical method, the crucial aspects of parenting which includes the parenting styles, contents of instructions and the goal of the instructions will be extracted. These aspects will ultimately serve as a foundation upon which child rearing in African communities be established. Understanding the Biblical teaching on child rearing in Proverbs 1-9 serves as a manual that deepens the understanding of Christian parenting in African communities hoping that it will contribute towards reducing anti-social ills. (shrink)

Further research on the theological contributions of experts at Vatican Council II has led to identifying six texts by Prof. Joseph Ratzinger, which are presented here. The theological themes expressed in these texts include an insistence on the interior dynamics and questioning of human beings in conceiving the present-day "hearer of the word" to which Vatican II will speak. One is not surprised by the Professor's repeated call for doctrinal formulations drawn from the biblical and patristic sources instead (...) of borrowing from recent theological textbooks. The lecture of October 10, 1962, develops, among other topics, an impressive account of God's self-revelation, which has primacy over the codified witness given by Scripture and tradition, which derive from the one fons that is God's self-manifestation. On biblical inspiration the Council should not attempt a systematic account but simply make reference to essential aspects: those active as human authors, their context which is salvation history, and the communities that they served by writing. All missionary activity in the Church arises ultimately from God's love poured out upon the world in the missions of the Son and Spirit and such action has its summa in Jesus' inaugural proclamation, "Be converted and believe in the Gospel" . In approaching its dialogue with the contemporary world, the Church speaks out of a complex conviction combining awareness that hum. (shrink)

In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, (...) jurisprudence is interpretive: “General theories of law… aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice”. Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word “law.” Legal philosophers “cannot produce useful semantic theories of law”. Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence “is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minding Brain Injury, Consciousness, and Ethics: Discourse and DeliberationsJoseph J. Fins (bio) and James Giordano (bio)The annual John Collins Harvey Lecture at the Georgetown University’s Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics is a forum for addressing contemporary topics at the intersection of medicine and bioethics. This year, in marking the decadal anniversary of the launch of the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnology (BRAIN) Initiative, the Harvey Lecture provided an (...) interactive discussion with renowned clinician, researcher, scholar, and author, Joseph J. Fins, MD—who is the E. William Davis, Jr., MD Professor of Medical Ethics, Chief of the Division of Medical Ethics, and a Professor of Medicine at Weill Cornell Medical College—conducted by James Giordano, PhD, MPhil—who is a Professor of Neurology and Biochemistry, and Chief of the Pellegrino Center’s Neuroethics Studies Program at the Georgetown University Medical Center. The discourse focused upon the topic of covert consciousness, and the ways in which current and developing brain science technologies, together with revised practices of medicine, in general, may afford new opportunities in patient care, but may also give rise to issues, questions, challenges, and opportunities for neuroethics.Prof. James GIORDANO:Prof. Fins, your most recent book, Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics, and the Struggle for Consciousness (Fins 2015), addresses your ongoing work to employ current and emerging neurological approaches to reveal conscious functions in patients with profound brain injury and disease. To be sure, the destination—if you will—is to talk about covert consciousness. But in commencing this discussion, I’d like to propose a route, which traces your professional journey to this point in your career, and how it led you on your search to reveal consciousness in those patients who lack expressive capability. You went into palliative care first, and that brought you to where you are today. [End Page 227]Prof. Joseph J. FINS:First, let me thank you and the Pellegrino Center for the honor of giving the John Harvey Collins Lecture in such an interactive manner. The forefront of neurological care—and the neuroethical issues and methods focal to such practice—wasn’t what I initially intended to do professionally, but I think that therein is a good lesson for young people’s career aspirations. Simply put, one doesn’t always know where they’ll end up at the beginning of the journey, and as Kierkegaard said, life is lived forward, but is understood backwards (Kierkegaard 1843).In the nineties and the early 2000s, I was trying to help improve the quality of care of people at the end of life, and I wrote a book, entitled The Palliative Ethic of Care: Clinical Wisdom at Life’s End (Fins 2006), in which I addressed notions of phronesis—practical wisdom—in integrating theory and practice toward improving how people die. I became interested in the Quinlan case (Quinlan 1976), and the right to die, and around the same time, I ran into a colleague of mine at Cornell: Dr. Nicholas D. Schiff. Dr. Schiff is a neurologist, who was a protégé of Fred Plum, who was the originator of the concept of the vegetative state with Bryan Jennett, back in 1972. Fred was both of our teachers here at Cornell. Niko (Dr. Schiff) was interested in patients with disorders of consciousness, and was beginning to envision doing work—that ultimately, we did—using deep brain stimulation (DBS) to try to treat patients in the minimally conscious state, a category that was subsequently codified in 2002.I realized that a whole population of people—with these disorders of consciousness—had been somewhat marginalized, and their neglect essentially devolves back to the considerations of the right to die. The right to die was established in the Quinlan case because Judge Hughes—the presiding chief judge of the New Jersey Supreme Court—talked about Ms. Quinlan’s loss of a cognitive, sapient state as being the moral warrant for her right to die, given the fact that it was viewed as a futile situation. I recognized, over the ensuing years—from my background in palliative and end-of-life care—[1] that we had over-generalized notions of futility... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers:A Contribution to the Problem of the Theologia Naturalis*Joseph RatzingerTranslated by Patricia PintadoPreface to the 1960 EditionThe remarks that I hereby present to the public consist in the reproduction of the inaugural lecture I gave on June 24, 1959, on the occasion of my appointment to the Chair of Fundamental Theology of the Catholic Faculty of Theology at the (...) University of Bonn. Several notes have been added to the unchanged text of the lecture to provide scholarly justification for what has been said. The aim of my remarks was to illuminate the problematic background of a word that is unfortunately all too worn out and to get to the bottom of a question that is of great importance both for the inner orientation of Catholic theology and for the dialogue between the denominations.I dedicate these lines to the memory of my father, who accompanied all my work with his caring sympathy until last August, when he was unexpectedly called from this world. As with my book on Bonaventure, I have to thank Schnell and Steiner publishing house for their cooperation that made it possible to print in this form.Bad Godesberg, Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1960. [End Page 1013]New Preface to the New Edition in 2004Almost half a century has passed since I gave the Bonn inaugural lecture in June of 1959. During this time, history has moved faster than ever before. To the dramatic upheavals in society, politics, science, and culture correspond also profound breakthroughs in philosophy and theology. Can a text from back then still be current even today? When I reread this lecture, which in the meantime had been published once again by my circle of students in a volume with texts written over the course of four decades,1 only then did I become fully aware of how much the questions posed back then have remained until today guidelines for my thinking. These questions recur in my Introduction to Christianity (1968), but especially in the lecture I gave at the Sorbonne in Paris entitled "Christianity—the True Religion?"2 Naturally, the lecture was modified and reshaped by each of the new contexts.What remains today, and what will be tomorrow a central task of theological thinking, is in any case the twofold question around which the considerations of the Bonn lecture revolved. There is first the general question of the relationship between faith and reason: what kind of rationality is appropriate for the Christian faith? How does faith fit into the whole of our existence? Is faith reconcilable with the fundamental insights that modern reason has acquired? Does the faith respond to reasonable questions and is its "reason" communicable? This fundamental problem inside our faith and theology becomes concrete as a question: Was the consummate connection in the nascent Church between Greek thought and biblical faith lawful, so that this relation belongs to "the essence of Christianity," or was it a "disastrous misunderstanding" from which we must finally liberate ourselves? Today, where Christianity in the West resolutely wishes to assimilate into other cultural spheres, stepping out of the Western world, this question has become an extremely urgent problem; this is also a fundamental problem in the conversation between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity on the one hand, and between the Protestant theological thought, on the other hand, which from the beginning critiqued the merger of metaphysics and faith, of Greek thought and biblical tradition. So, it appears to me that the attempt then to rewrite the foundational problems of fundamental theology, which [End Page 1014] I dared at the beginning of my theological work, can also today provide an impetus to theological thought, in order—in our own context—to satisfy our obligation to give an answer to those who ask about the Logos—the reason—for our hope (1 Pet 3:15).I give my heartfelt thanks to the publishing house for the initiative to reprint this small text, and likewise to my third successor as chair of Fundamental Theology in Bonn, Prof. Dr. Heino Sonnemans, for his friendly cooperation in this project.Rome, Feast of Saints Peter... (shrink)

Professor Robert Alexy wrote a book whose avowed purpose is to refute the basic tenets of a type of legal theory which 'has long since been obsolete in legal science and practice'. The quotation is from the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1968. The fact that Prof Alexy himself mentions no writings in the legal positivist tradition [in English] later than Hart's The Concept of Law (1961) may suggest that he shares the court's view. The book itself may be (...) evidence to the contrary. After all why flog a dead horse? Why write a book to refute a totally discredited theory? Perhaps Alexy was simply unlucky. The burst of reflective, suggestive and interesting writings in the legal positivist tradition reached serious dimensions only in the years after the original publication of his book, when Waldron, Marmor, Gardner, Leiter, Shapiro, Murphy, Himma, Kramer, Endicott, Lamont, Dickson, Bix and others joined those who had made important contributions to legal theory in the positivistic tradition in the years preceding the original publication of Alexy's book: Lyons, Coleman, Campbell, Harris, Green, Waluchow and others, who are still among the main contributors to legal theory in the positivist tradition. It is a great shame that nothing in these writings influenced the arguments of the book. Perhaps this regret is misplaced. After all ‘positivism' in legal theory means, and always did mean, different things to different people. What Radbruch, one of Alexy's heroes, meant when he first saw himself as a legal positivist and then recanted was not the same as what 'legal positivism' means in Britain (and nowadays in the United States as well) among those who engage in philosophical reflection about the nature of law. Perhaps Alexy is simply addressing himself to a German audience, and refuting, or attempting to refute, legal theories of a kind identified in Germany as 'legal positivism'. Perhaps, though his references to Hart show that he does not intend it that way. My aims in this chapter are, however, reasonably clear. My main purpose is to explore whether any of Alexy's arguments challenge any of the views which I have advocated. Subsidiary aims are, first, to clarify why what Alexy says is legal positivism is not what is understood as such in the English speaking world, so that some of Alexy's sound points find no target; secondly, to try and clarify some of his arguments which I found, at least initially, rather obscure. Given the prominence of Alexy's book I will refer only to it, and will not consider his other publications. (shrink)

Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands Aquinas' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon's misinterpretation of Carroll's and Thomas Aquinas' thought, particularly by stressing the dependence that the doctrine (...) of providence through secondary causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

Gayretimin bir kısmı bilim dünyasına hizmet, ama diğer çok mühim bir gayesi ise; koskoca bir İslam aleminin yitirmiş olduğu kendine hürmeti, güveni ve insanlık tarihindeki yerini hatırlatmak, kaybettiklerini inşa etmek içindir. Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin anısına ithaf ettiğimiz Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Özel Sayımıza hoşgeldiniz. Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin, 24 Ekim 1924 tarihinde Bitlis’te dünyaya gelen Fuat Sezgin, il-kokulu Doğubayazıt’ta, ortaokul ve liseyi ise Erzurum’da bitirdikten sonra 1943 yılında İstanbul’a geldi. İstanbul Üniversitesi şarkiyat (...) (Doğu bilimi) Araştırmaları Enstitüsü’nde ünlü Alman şarkiyatçı Prof. Dr. Hellmut Ritter’in (1892-1971) öğrencisi olan Sezgin, Ritter’in tavsiyesi üzerine İslâm bilimlerine yöneldi. 1951’de İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakülte-si’den mezun olduktan sonra Arap Dili ve Edebiyatı alanında “Buhârî’nin Kaynakları Hakkın-da Araştırmalar” başlıklı teziyle doktorasını tamamladı. Bu çalışmasıyla, hadis kaynağı olarak İslâm kültüründe önemli bir yere sahip olan Buhârî’nin sözlü kaynaklar yerine yazılı kaynaklara dayandığı tezini ortaya attı. Doçent unvanını 1954 yılında alan Sezgin, 1960 askeri darbesinin ardından üniversi-telerden uzaklaştırılan 147 akademisyen arasında kendi adının da bulunması üzerine 1961’de Türkiye’den ayrıldı ve çalışmalarına Goethe Üniversitesi’nde (Frankfurt) devam etti. Câbir bin Hayyân hakkında hazırladığı ikinci tezini 1965’te Goethe Üniversitesi Doğa Bilimleri tarihi Enstitüsü’ne sunan ve bir yıl sonra profesörlüğe yükseltilen Sezgin, aynı yıl kendisi gibi şarkiyatçı olan Ursula Sezgin ile Evlendi. Alanında şimdiye kadar yazılan en kapsamlı eser kabul edilen Geshichte des arabisc-hen Schrifttums (Arapça Yazma Eserler Literatürü Tarihi) başlıklı kapsamlı eserinin ilk cildini 1967’de yayımlayan Sezgin, 1978’de Kral Faysal İslâmi İlimler Ödülü’ne lâyık görüldü. Bu ödül nedeniyle kendisine takdim edilen maddi desteği değerlendirerek 1982’de Goethe Üniversitesi Arap-İslâm Bilimleri Tarihi Enstitrüsü’nü, ertesi yıl ise bu enstitü bünyesinde, tarih boyunca Müslüman bilim insanlarının icat ettiği 800’den fazla bilimsel alet ve düzene-ğinin modellerinin sergilendiği İslam Bilim ve teknoloji Müzesi’ni kurdu. Bu müzenin bir benzerini 2008 yılında istanbul’da kuran Sezgin, 2010 yılında Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin İslam Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Vakfı’nın kuruluşuna öncülük etti. Kahire Arap Dili Akademisi, Şam Arap Dili Akademisi, Fas Rabat Kraliyet Akademisi, Bağdat Arap Dili Akademisi, Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi şeref üyeliği de dâhil olmak üzere çok sayıda ödül ve nişana layık görülen Sezgin’e; Erciyes Üniversitesi, Atatürk Üniversitesi, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi ve İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından fahri doktora unvanları verildi. Frankfurt am Main Goethe Plaketi, Almanya Üstün Hizmet Madalyası, İran İslâmi Bilimler Kitap Ödülü ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kültür ve Sanat Büyük Ödülü ile taltif edildi. Prof. Sezgin’in öncülüğünde kurulan İstanbul İslâm Bilim ve teknoloji tarihi Müzesi, Kültür ve Turizm bakanlığı 2016 özel Ödülü’ne lâyık görüldü. Arapça, Süryanice, İbranice, Latince ve Almanca başta olmak üzere 27 dil bilen Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin, 30 Haziran 2018’de İstanbul’da vefat etti ve Gülhane Parkı’ndaki İstanbul İslâm Bilim ve teknoloji tarihi Müzesi’nin bahçesine defnedildi. Vefatının ardından, 2018/6 sayılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı genelgesi ile 2019 yılı “Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Yılı” olarak ilân edildi. Cumhurbaşkanlığı genelgesinde "İslam kültür ve medeniyetinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlamak ve onu yeni nesillere en doğru şekilde aktarmak amacıyla yapılacak söz konusu çalışmalara ilgili tüm kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarınca her türlü destek ve katkının sağlanması hususunda gereğini rica ederim." İfadelerine yer verilerek Fuat Sezgin’in ülke sathında anlatılması ve düşüncelerinin anlaşılması için çeşitli faaliyetlerin yürütülmesi istenmişti. Koordinasyon Merkezi olarak da Kırıkkale Üniversitesi seçildi Dünyanın önde gelen bilim tarihçilerinden olan, İslam Bilim Tarihi alanındaki çalışmaları bulunan Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin’i gelecek nesillere tanıtmak, fikirlerini anlatmak amacıyla Sivas Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi tarafından da birçok faaliyet yapıldı. Dünyanın önde gelen bilim tarihçilerinden Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin’e, İslam Bilim Tarihi alanındaki çalışmalarından dolayı Üniversitemiz tarafından “Fahri Bilim Doktoru” unvanı verildi. Prof. Dr. Sezgin’e fahri bilim doktoru unvanı verilmesi dolayısıyla Üniversitemiz Kül-tür Merkezi’nde düzenlenen tören İstiklal Marşımızın okunması ve saygı duruşuyla başladı. Programa Rektörümüz Prof. Dr. Alim Yıldız, Sivas Belediye Başkan Yardımcısı Ah-met Özaydın, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Üniversitesi Rektörü Prof. Dr. Musa Uzun, öğretim elemanları ve öğrenciler katıldı. Rektörümüz Prof. Dr. Alim Yıldız yaptığı açış konuşmasında, "İnsanlara İslam bilimlerinin gerçeğini tanıtmak, benlik duygularını olumsuz etkileyen yanlış yargılardan onları kurtarmak ve ferdin ehemmiyetine olan inancı kazandırmak amacıyla İslam Bilimi Tarihi araştırmalarına adanmış bir ömürdür Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Hocamız. Öyle büyük bir otoritedir ki onu anmadan, onun hazırladığı eserlere bakmadan, bilim tarihiyle, İslam tarihiyle ilgili ortaya bir şeyler sunabilmek çok zordur. Bilim tarihinin en çalışkan, en birikimli bilim insanlarından biridir. İslam tarihine, İslam düşüncesine, İslami eserlere ve bilim dünyasına vermiş olduğu katkılarıyla bir medeniyet kâşifi, eşi bulunmaz bir değer ve ‘darbeler neden kötüdür’ sorusunun mücessem cevabıdır Prof. Dr. Sezgin. Bizim medeniyet ve kültürümüzde kültür, sanat ve beşerin, Yaratıcının her eserinde müşahede ettiği güzellikleri, çeşitli yol ve yöntemlerle ortaya koymasının vasıtasıdır. Bilgiyi hikmetle taçlandırıp irfana ulaştırmadıkça hiçbir şeyi yerli yerine oturtamayız." dedi. Konuşmanın ardından Rektör Yıldız, 93 yaşındaki Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin’e cübbe giydirdi. Daha sonra Sezgin katılımcılara ‘Arap İslam Tarihinden Bazı İzlenimler’ konulu ders verdi. Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin, “İnsanların bilgi tarihi ile ilgili verileri yazılı olarak kaydetme gayreti, politik tarihe olana nispetle tesadüflere ve keyfi değerlendirmelere göre çok geri zamanlarda oldu. İslam bilim tarihi yüksek ve kaliteli görüşleri yansıtır. Bunları burada sunamayacağım. Birçoğunu Arap-İslam tarihi adlı kitabımın bugüne kadar çıkmış olan 17. cildinde kaydetmeye çalıştım. Onu İstanbul’da Gülhane Parkı’nda İslam Tarihi Araştırmaları Vakfı yayınları arasında bulabilirsiniz.” dedi. Prof. Dr. Sezgin “Bilimler tarihinin verilerini değerlendirmekte, yaşanılan zamanın etüt şartını gözden kaçırılmasının esas olması gerektiğini anladım ve henüz kitabımı yazma-ya başlamadan rastladığım Fransız Coğrafya tarihçisi Joseph Toussaint Renaud (1795-1867)’un şu sözleri beni çok etkilemişti. “Tesadüf teknik ve sanatın ilerlemesinde çok büyük bir rol oynamaz. İnsanlar buluşlarında devamlı bir şekilde birden bir sıçrayışla değil, adım adım hareket eder. Her zaman aynı hızda değil, fakat devamlı olarak insan icat etmez. Olanı ilerletir.” ifadelerine yer verdi. Konuşmasının sonunda Prof. Dr. Sezgin, “Benim 65 yıldır yaymaya çalıştığım Arap İslam bilimleri tarihi hemen hemen her gün beni hayata bağladı. İslam dünyasında büyük bir hızla ilerleyen bilimler MS. 8. yüzyıldan itibaren Fransa ve İngiltere’ye diğer taraftan 10 ve 11. yüzyıldan itibaren Sicilya’ya ve İtalya’ya 9. yüzyıldan itibaren Bizans’a ulaştılar. Avrupa-lılar teknik bilimleri diğer bilimlere nazaran daha kolay anlıyor ve alabiliyorlardı. Bu anlam-da onlar 16. yüzyılda bazı yönlerde Müslümanlara ulaşmaya hatta onları geçmeye başladılar.” ifadelerini kullandı. Programın sonunda Rektörümüz ve Fatih Sultan Mehmet Üniversitesi Rektörü Prof. Dr. Musa Duman, Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin’e tezhipli bir tablo hediye ettiler. 2019 Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Yılı kapsamında Sivas Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Merkezî Kütüphanesi’ne Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin’in ismi verildi. Ayrıca Üniversitemiz Rektörlüğü tarafından düzenlenen 5’inci Hazan Şiir Dinletisi Sezgin anısına ithaf edilmiştir. 2019 yılının Haziran ayı içerisinde ise Üniversitemiz Rektörlüğü öncülüğünde ve İlahiyat Fakültesi Dekanlığınca ile Sivas Merkez Ulu Cami’de merhum Prof. Dr. Sezgin için Kur’an-ı Kerim tilaveti ve Mevlid-i Şerif programı gerçekleştirilmiştir. Son olarak üniversitemiz rektörlüğü tarafından desteklenen ve Sivas Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi tarafından yayımlanan Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi’nin 23. Cilt 3. Sayısı (Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Özel Sayısı) Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin anısına ithaf edilmiştir. Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri alanından birçok güncel ve ilgi çekici araştırmayı bir araya getirdiğimiz sayımızı sizlere sunmaktan heyecan ve mutluluk duyuyoruz. Bize emanet edi-len değerli çalışmaları uluslararası alana taşımak için geniş bir ekiple tüm gayretimizi gösterdiğimizi ifade etmek isteriz. Yeni sayımızda başta makale sahibi değerli bilim insanlarımıza, yayın, danışma ve hakem kurullarımıza, Rektörlüğümüz Basımevi personeline ve özellikle dergimizin yayın aşamasında yadsınmaz emekleri olan alan editörlerimiz Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Adem Çiftçi, Arş. Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Gör. Fatma Kurttekin, Arş. Gör. Maruf Çakır, Arş. Gör. Alper Ay, Arş. Gör. Esma Güneş, Gör. Bayram Ünce, Arş. Gör. Sena Kaplan, Arş. Gör. Gülistan Aktaş,Arş. Gör. Hamit Demir Arş. Gör. Merve Yetim, Arş. Gör. Rukiye Göğen, Arş. Gör. Ömer Faruk Özbek, Arş. Gör. Salime Bera Kemikli, Arş. Gör. Naim Yaman, Arş. Gör. Sema Tombul, Arş. Gör. Nurgül Akdoğan, Arş. Gör. Ayşe Mine Akar, Arş. Gör. İlknur Bahadır ile Arapça dil editörü Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Yavuz ve İngilizce dil kontrolü sorumluluğunu üstlenen alan editörlerimiz Dr. Miyase Yavuz Altıntaş, Uzm. Zeynep Yücedoğru, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Zuhal Ağılkaya Şahin, Dr. Metin Güven ve Dr. Kenan Tekin’e teşekkür ederiz. Dergimizin 23. Cilt 2. ve 3. Sayı (Özel Sayı)’larından itibaren Yazı İşleri Müdürü olarak Dr. Ahmet Çelik’in görevlendirildiğini bildirir kendisine yeni görevinde başarılar dileriz. Önceki sayılarımızda dergimizin Yazı İşleri Müdürlüğünü ifa eden Doç. Dr. Ali Yılmaz’a teşekkürlerimizi sunarız. 15 Haziran 2020’de yayınlanacak bir sonraki sayımız için makale kabul tarihlerinin yayın kurulumuz tarafından 1 Ocak- 15 Mart olarak değiştirildiğini hatırlatır çalışmalarınız-da kolaylıklar dileriz. 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I propose to analyze the concept of basing beliefs on reasons. The concept is an important one in understanamg the so-called "inferential" or "indirect" knowledge. After briefly stating the causal analyses of this concept given by D.M. Armstrong and Marshall Swain I will present two cases which show these analyses to be too strong and too weak. Finally, I will propose an analysis which avoids these twin difficulties.

The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalmus. This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I. This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be (...) read in conjunction with Part I. (shrink)

Generalization is a fundamental problem solved by every cognitive system in essentially every domain. Although it is known that how people generalize varies in complex ways depending on the context or domain, it is an open question how people learn the appropriate way to generalize for a new context. To understand this capability, we cast the problem of learning how to generalize as a problem of learning the appropriate hypothesis space for generalization. We propose a normative mathematical framework for learning (...) how to generalize by learning inductive biases for which properties are relevant for generalization in a domain from the statistical structure of features and concepts observed in that domain. More formally, the framework predicts that an ideal learner should learn to generalize by either taking the weighted average of the results of generalizing according to each hypothesis space, with weights given by how well each hypothesis space fits the previously observed concepts, or by using the most likely hypothesis space. We compare the predictions of this framework to human generalization behavior with three experiments in one perceptual (rectangles) and two conceptual (animals and numbers) domains. Across all three studies we find support for the framework's predictions, including individual‐level support for averaging in the third study. (shrink)

Publishers love titles that begin How or Why. Better still, How and Why, combining edification with utility. The target group is that overlap between the self-help audience and the idly curious—which is to say, most of us. And since emotions are very much about self-help and self-harm, they offer rich pickings in a burgeoning market. Flanagan's How to Do things with Emotions is a philosopher's take on moral emotions, the allusion to J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (...) chiming with the self-help milieu. Reviewing cases, Flanagan points out that most scientific work in this field derives from experiments on psychology students, about as unrepresentative a slice of humanity as you could find. For Flanagan, they are too WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) to tell us much about the non-weird majority. To learn to “do emotions better,” he argues, we have to look farther afield. Although the emotional lives of cultural others are surely different from those taking Psychology 101, at some functional level they might be similar. Work out the conceptual logic and practical rationale of culturally elaborated emotions—Minangkabau “shame,” Ifaluk “righteous anger,” American “road rage”—and there is scope for comparison. Indeed, anthropology has shown as much, and it is from anthropology that Flanagan takes his cues. To mention two famous cases, what can we learn about anger management from Utku igloo-dwellers and Ilongot headhunters? Mutually dependent for survival in their snowy isolation, the Utku cannot risk getting angry. (They mercilessly tease their children into learning the futility of anger.) In the jungles of Luzon, Ilongot youths cast away their anger in externally directed violence: headhunting as cathartic sport. We can think of parallels closer to home.Flanagan's vigorously argued book, a tour de force of its kind, is both an anatomizing of anger and shame—two moral emotions we tend to “do badly”—and a proposal to “change how we do these emotions.” Indignation is fine, but anger that is vengeful or “pain-passing,” rather than righteous, is irrational and socially harmful. Shame can be incapacitating and cruel (the undeserved burn of a Twitter pile-on). What we need is reflective anger directed at injustice and a “mature sense of shame” that reminds us of the social contract and stops us misbehaving.In its How-and-Why format, the book combines theory and practice, metaethics with moralism. Here is how a prof should do self-help. But if the diagnosis is well made, the remedy is hard to imagine. As Flanagan recognizes, moral sentiments and practices are embedded in intricate forms of life and not readily detachable. Anger Utku-style is not a transferable skill, nor are educative routines forged in social ecologies remote from our own. Lacking serviceable models, Flanagan falls back on the anthropological justification that knowledge of cultural diversity expands our sense of human possibility, of other roads taken. In a globalizing world, difference is its own reward. For me, an anthropologist, that maxim is enough. Yet difference bedevils comparison, jinxing the units, warping criteria. Most languages lack a word for emotion or an equivalent umbrella concept; nor do emotion words translate well across languages. Emotion may be an incoherent notion, or at best a heuristic.Flanagan's use of the WEIRD tag makes things a bit too easy. Does it cover farmhands and factory workers? Are we so democratic, anyway? More damagingly, a typological approach blurs the circumstances of family, community, and biography that define an emotional episode and shape its phenomenology, the way it is felt and experienced—what a violent outburst or fearful exit means in the context of a life. Take Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim, who flees a scene of failure and derails his life. It requires a long narrative to unravel the implications of his jumping ship and the paralyzing shame he experiences before the judgment of society. Or consider the scene in Anna Karenina in which the dignified and self-important Karenin, apprised of Anna's adulterous liaison, agonizes over the threat to his existence. To call his response jealousy would not scratch the surface. Characteristically for Tolstoy, the emotions go unnamed. Instead, we witness Karenin's fervid deliberations (emotions involve thoughts), vacillations (emotions have action tendencies), anguished calculations of impending scandal (emotions are appraisals), and bodily changes (emotions are cognized feelings). We shudder at the brutal metaphors through which he grasps his predicament and its cure: like rooting out a bad tooth, he decides. That welter of particularities escapes the theorist who needs clear-cut, comparable units, formulaic instances of jealousy or anger. But what are you left with if you omit the details? What would remain of Karenin's existential crisis?The novelist's privileged access to subjectivity is, of course, unavailable to the scientist, but the larger context of plot and character—a history of relations that gives emotional episodes their shape and power—has its analog in the ethnographic domain. Emotions are public as well as private events, their meanings and effects depending on a fit with social reality, a clash of perspectives. In thought and feeling, we are never really alone. All of which suggests that narrative, fictional or nonfictional, can capture the ongoing moment in a way that eludes other methods. If what we are after is living emotion, it is the movie, not the snapshot, that surely matters. No point in comparing “emotions” no one ever really experienced outside of an experiment.But there's the rub. In generalization—the goal of emotion theory—an emotion's social meaning, personal significance, pragmatic function, and narrative context get stripped out. All that makes it what it is! Even in doggedly empirical anthropology, detailed emotional episodes are rare (Jean Briggs's Utku ethnography Never in Anger, published in 1970, is still unsurpassed). Instead we get recollections and summary examples, lacking the constitutive detail, real-time evolutions, and consequences of the real thing. Yet these must serve for comparison, fodder for countless theoretical speculations. Are we at risk of analyzing faux emotions and building theories on cardboard constructions?An empty Arctic stage, a handful of characters, life simplified to survival: Briggs is a hard act to follow. Bare life does not make for basic emotions. On the white set, emotions prove hard to parse. That gruff hesitation, that flashing glint—are they tokens of anger? Empathy will not suffice. As Briggs shows, narrative context is all. And in our more cluttered emotional worlds, the value of backstory, interwoven biographies, and emotional plots is all the greater. Flanagan is right; we must do emotions better. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 473-479, May 2022.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ahead of Print.

ABSTRACTMichelle Amazeen's rebuttal of Uscinski and Butler 2013 is unsuccessful. Amazeen's attempt to infer the accuracy of fact checks from their agreement with each other fails on its own terms and, in any event, could as easily be explained by fact checkers’ political biases as their common access to the objective truth. She also ignores the distinction between verifiable facts and unverifiable claims about the future, as well as contestable claims about the causes of political, social, and economic phenomena. The (...) social benefits that she claims for the fact-checking enterprise must, at the very least, be weighed against the strong possibility that what passes for fact checking is actually just a veiled continuation of politics by means of journalism rather than being an independent, objective counterweight to political untruths. (shrink)

Given the excessive moralization of human rights and their universal ideologization, which has led to unfortunate consequences such as erasure of cultural differences and standardization, given the right, and even the duty, to intervene (the right of the strongest), and the craze for ‘democracy’ despite the will of peoples, the time has come to undertake an academic analysis of the founding texts in order to make them intelligible, in spite of the fact that human rights have become a bible. Even (...) the revealed word of the Bible is scrutinized by exegetical analysis, historical criticism and hermeneutics, which have not stopped it surviving. It should be the same for human rights. (shrink)

An introduction to the Yijing (I Ching) 易經 or Classic/Scripture of Change : its nature, its history of interpretation, and its cultural influences. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Das heftig diskutierte Werk Joseph Beuys? ist eines der einflussreichsten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Sein schöpferischer Reichtum umfasst bildnerische, philosophische und politische Aspekte. Die Aufzeichnungen, Gespräche und Vorträge von Joseph Beuys gehören zu seinem Werk wie seine Zeichnungen, Installationen und Aktionen. Sein bildnerisches Werk konfrontiert mit Rätseln, die nach dem Menschen fragen. Durch deren Aufschlüsseln sucht er ein Denken zu provozieren, das in Intuition umschlägt. Sie setzt kreative Kräfte frei, eine innere Freiheit, durch die der Einzelne auf eine Transformation (...) der Gesellschaft einwirken kann: 'Die einzig revolutionäre Kraft ist die Kraft der menschlichen Kreativität.' Diese Transformation ist die Aufgabe, die Beuys mit dem erweiterten Kunstbegriff gestellt hat.0Mit Aufzeichnungen von 1961, als Beuys Professor an der Kunstakademie wird, beginnt die Chronologie dieser Sammlung. Sie setzt sich fort mit Gesprächen, die durch die politischen Auseinandersetzungen der sechziger und siebziger Jahre führen und Antworten auf seine Arbeiten geben. Mit Beuys' Spürsinn, sich auf sein Gegenüber einzulassen, werden die Gespräche Aktion und bewahren durch ihre Lebendigkeit und Provokation ihre Gegenwart. Der Band erscheint anlässlich des 100. Geburtstags von Joseph Beuys am 12. Mai 2021. (shrink)

The focus on this volume is on logic and how the logic of foundational hierarchies may be applied to clarify the relationship between sociological theory and empirical research. The author articulates a logical calculus as a method for theory construction.

This paper was originally delivered orally at a meeting of the Semiotic Society of America in Lubbock, Texas in 1980 and first published in Semiotics 1980, eds. Michael Herzfeld and Margot Lenhart (New York: Plenum Press, 1982), 427-438. The present version is only lightly revised from the original but a more extensive revision is in process.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Eternal Life and Human Happiness in Heaven: Philosophical Problems, Thomistic Solutions by Christopher M. BrownElizabeth C. Shaw and Staff*BROWN, Christopher M. Eternal Life and Human Happiness in Heaven: Philosophical Problems, Thomistic Solutions. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021. xiii + 487 pp. Cloth, $75.00The contents of the book are straightforwardly announced by the title. Christopher Brown entertains four apparent problems about eternal life in heaven (...) considered by contemporary philosophers and theologians and offers solutions to them from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. The book consists of seventeen chapters together with an introduction and conclusion and is divided into four parts. In the first part Brown lays out the problems and the solutions to them proposed by contemporary philosophers and theologians. In the second part he explains St. Thomas's distinction between essential and accidental reward in heaven and goes on to treat of the former—which consists in the beatific vision, that is, our beholding of God—and its proper accidents—which are delight, joy, and charity. In the third part he then deals with the accidental reward, which has to do with the perfected condition of our glorified bodies, society with other persons, and so on. Finally, in the fourth part Brown, drawing on his expositions of St. Thomas's doctrine in the two previous parts, details Thomistic solutions to the four problems discussed in the first part and argues that these solutions are superior to those proposed by the contemporary philosophers and theologians he has engaged.So, what are the four problems that Brown addresses? Let's present them as questions. (1) Is heaven just a private communion between a human person and God, or is it a perfect community centered on God that also involves angels, other human persons, and other creatures? (2) Is heaven just a spiritual affair, or are our resurrected bodies a part of it? (3) Is heaven a static or dynamic reality? (4) Is heaven boring?The answers are as follows. Ad primum: Heaven is a perfect community centered on God that also involves angels, other human persons, and other creatures. Ad secundum: Heaven is a spiritual and physical affair that includes our souls and our resurrected bodies. Ad tertium: Heaven is a dynamic reality. Ad quartum: Heaven is not boring!I cannot cover here all of the specifics of the way Brown shows how St. Thomas arrives at these answers. People who know St. Thomas well, even if they have not reflected much on these problems before, probably will [End Page 135] not have great difficulty thinking through how he might get to the first and second answers, at least in general terms. But the third and fourth, I think, call for further comment. My comments will necessarily be brief.If I understand Brown correctly, he wants to say (and contends that St. Thomas holds) that heaven is dynamic insofar as in heaven we are in act. But we can be in act in two senses: We can be in act in an unchanging way or in a changing way. In heaven my capacities to know God and to love him are both fully perfected, that is, they are fully actualized and undergo no change. But in heaven we will enjoy our resurrected bodies as well, and our bodies will also be active and interacting with other bodies. This activity will entail change. So, either way we will be active in heaven and, therefore, heaven will be something dynamic.What, then, about the problem of boredom? Because we will be perfectly happy in heaven, argues Brown (interpreting St. Thomas), heaven won't be boring. But the matter doesn't end there. Brown points out that Brian Ribeiro, developing an idea of Bernard Williams, objects that a person who is perfectly happy in the way that we are supposed to be in heaven, cannot be personally identical with any person in this life because the conditions of the beatified person and the nonbeatified person are just too radically different for there to be continuity between the two. Brown replies that St. Thomas convincingly shows that God can, by grace, prepare persons in this... (shrink)

Introduction Joseph Dunne, Attracta Ingram, Frank Litton This volume of essays has two main objectives: first, to pay tribute to Fergal O'Connor, ...

According to a two-level criterion for combination tests in the field of ordinary language, moral 'ought'-sentences may be taken to imply 'I intend'-sentences partly semantically and partly pragmatically. If so, a trenchant linguistic analysis of the concept of moral obligation cannot do without a non-classical logic which allows to model these important kinds of ordinary-language implications by means of purely syntactical derivations. For this purpose, an integrated logic of conviction and intention has been tentatively devised by way of a doxastically, (...) buletically, and pragmatically extended calculus of natural deduction. This system of buletic logic cannot even be launched without one or two derivation rules of deductive closedness. However, these very closedness rules appear to be responsible for buletic paradoxes which are analogous to paradoxes long since known from other, less exotic branches of logic but at first sight look much more virulent. After having scrutinized two potential strategies for coping with the paradoxes of buletic logic, finally we can convince ourselves that these paradoxes, as well as their familiar non-buletic counterparts, are but apparent paradoxes, provided we consistently lean on C-CT and do not let pragmatical considerations intrude into purely logical ones. (shrink)

Parkinson, Joseph Research shows that sexual orientation is neither well defined nor ultimately defining for adolescents seeking self-identity. Rather, the data on instability of sexual orientation among youth and young adults suggest that most of the time unquestioning affirmation of an adolescent's claimed same-sex attraction will do more long-term harm than good. This article explores this complexity and proposes more appropriate ways to provide excellent pastoral care in schools.